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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Overview 
This article will examine when some attorney-client 
communications may be considered in connection with a spoliation 
claim based on an alleged breach of the duty to preserve 
information. 1 The steps taken by a client to fulfill the duty to 
preserve information, even if taken in response to privileged 
communications, have been held to be discoverable, although related 
attorney communications have not been routinely discoverable.2 
Where there is a preliminary showing of a breach of the duty to 
preserve information, at least some attorney-client implementation3 
1. See infra Part V. 
2. See infra Part III. 
3. When "implement," "implementation communications," and other similar terms and 
phrases are used in this article, they refer to what was said and done in the course of 
issuing a litigation hold notice, interviewing records custodians, information 
technology personnel, key players, computer forensic experts, and generally 
monitoring the preservation process. 
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communications have not been protected by courts faced with the 
issue.4 
The courts' decisions may be supported by a number of different 
theories, including: the communications are in furtherance of a 
common-law duty, and not for the purpose of seeking legal advice; 
under the crime, fraud, or tort exception to the privilege; under the 
theory that the communications are fact work product and disclosable 
pursuant to established work product rules; because they are put in 
issue by an "advice of counsel" defense; or, under the attorney "self-
defense" doctrine.5 In short, there are two alternative paradigms. 
Under one, the communications are not privileged at al1.6 Under the 
other, they are treated as exceptions to the privilege.7 
Under the first rationale, because preservation communications are 
made pursuant to a duty· imposed by law, they are not privileged 
communications seeking legal advice and absent a preliminary 
showing of breach of the duty to preserve,· the attorney-client 
communications are wholly irrelevant to the claims, defenses, and 
subject-matter of the action, and therefore not discoverable.8 Under 
the second theory, attorney-client preservation communications are 
inherently privileged or work product; however, at least portions of 
them may become discoverable under either an exception to, or 
waiver of, those protections. The communications become relevant 
when there is a preliminary showing of a failure to preserve 
information that should have been preserved.9 Regardless of the 
rationale, it appears settled that, upon such a preliminary showing, 
some attorney-client communications become discoverable. 10 
The outer boundary of a reviewing court's inquiry into attorney-
client preservation communications and analysis, however, remains 
to be determined. Courts may distinguish between legal advice 
related to preservation, on the one hand, and implementation 
communications, on the other, with the former remaining protected 
by the privilege in all but the most egregious circumstances, and the 
latter open to discovery upon a preliminary showing of breach of 
4. See infra Part IlLB-D. 
5. See infra Part IV.B-D, v. 
6. See infra Part V.C. 
7. See discussion infra Part IV.C. Although the attorney-client privilege is separate and 
distinct from the work-product doctrine, on occasion the two are combined under the 
umbrella of "privilege" for simplicity. 
8. See infra Part IV.E. 
9. See infra Part lV.A. 
10. See infra Part IV. 
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duty. II It is not clear whether legal analysis and advice concerning 
preservation decisions, and client's specific requests for advice, will 
be discoverable in some instances. 12 
B. Factual Hypothetical 
Assume the following: ABC Corporation reasonably anticipates 
litigation with XYZ Corporation related to a June 2003 contract. 
Eight weeks after litigation is anticipated, ABC's attorney sends key 
employees a "privileged and confidential" litigation hold letter 
directing preservation of all "relevant evidence." A month later, 
ABC's attorney speaks with some ABC employees, but not with 
others. ABC's president asks ABC's attorney to define the outer 
contours of the duty to preserve, and they discuss how those 
principles are applicable to ABC in this instance. ABC's counsel 
retains a non-testifying forensic computer expert and, at counsel's 
direction, the expert and ABC employees preserve some 
electronically stored information (ESI) and paper documents, but-in 
conjunction with ABC's attorneys--<ietermine that other ESI, e.g., 
certain back up tapes and deleted data, need not be preserved. This 
latter decision is based on counsel's analysis of case law defining the 
duty to preserve back up tapes and data that are not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost. A lawsuit is 
subsequently commenced against ABC. In discovery, XYZ asks 
ABC employees to describe their preservation efforts, and XYZ 
establishes that ABC failed to preserve unique information that was 
relevant and allegedly subject to the duty to preserve. XYZ then 
moves for sanctions. 
In resolving that motion, what facts may the reviewing court 
consider? Is ABC's litigation hold letter discoverable, in part or in its 
entirety? Can XYZ properly discover what steps ABC employees 
and experts took to fulfill the duty to preserve, given the fact that 
those steps were taken on advice and instruction of counsel? Are 
some or all of the details of ABC's attorney's communications with 
ABC's key players open for deposition inquiry? Is counsel's analysis 
and application of case law defining the duty to preserve back up 
tapes open to discovery? Is the legal advice given by ABC's counsel 
to ABC's president discoverable? And, if ABC believes that it 
fulfilled its duty to preserve under the circumstances presented, can 
II. See infra Part IV.B. 
12. See infra Part VI. 
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ABC voluntarily present evidence of its due diligence, without 
waiving its attorney-client privilege? 
This article examines the answers that courts have given to some of 
these questions and the way the rulings offer counsel and their clients 
guidance on what to expect in the event that an opposing party 
questions their compliance with the duty to preserve relevant 
information. It does so in the context that "lawyers must understand 
that information, as a cultural and technological edifice, has 
profoundly and irrevocably changed. There has been a civilization-
wide mOfPh, or pulse, or one might say that information has 
evolved.,,1 This has resulted in a "need to re-engineer" the litigation 
process. 14 
C. Background 
When a prospective party reasonably anticipates litigation, that 
party has a duty to preserve potentially relevant material. The duty 
to preserve is one of the fundamental common-law foundations of the 
adversarial system of justice. In today's litigation environment, it is 
counsel who most often notify clients of the duty to preserve and 
oversee the preservation process, draft litigation hold notices, 
interview records custodians, key persons, and information 
technology personnel, and take other steps to ensure that the duty to 
preserve is not breached. 16 
The attorney-client privilege and work product protection are 
likewise fundamental underpinnings of the adversarial system of 
justice. The attorney-client privilege exists to encourage full and 
frank communication between counsel and client. 17 The work-
13. George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System 
Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, "tl I (2007), http://law.richmond.eduljoltlv13i3/ 
articlelO.pdf. 
14. Jd. "tl26. 
15. See, e.g., Mosel Vitelic Corp. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 307,310-11 (D. 
Del. 2000) ("A party, who is aware that evidence might be relevant to a pending or 
future litigation, has an affirmative duty to preserve this material. This duty extends 
to that party's attorneys." (citations omitted)); Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gcn. 
Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1446 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that GNC had a 
duty to preserve relevant documents at inception oflitigation). 
16. The contours of the duty to preserve are discussed in a related article in this issue. 
See Paul W. Grimm et ai., Proportionality in the Post-Hoc Analysis of Pre-Litigation 
Preservation Decisions, 37 U. BALT. L. REv. 381 (2008). 
17. E.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("Its purpose is to 
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and 
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration 
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product doctrine recognizes that, in the adversarial system of justice, 
"[p]roper preparation of a client's case demands that [counsel] 
assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from 
the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy 
without undue and needless interference.,,18 Under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), discovery of an opposing party's work 
product is permitted only upon a showing "that the party seeking 
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of 
the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to 
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.,,19 
When discovery of fact work product is permitted, courts are 
enjoined to "protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney.,,20 
In the absence of a breach of the duty to preserve, courts have not 
hesitated to hold that attorney-client preservation communications are 
not discoverable; however, faced with a preliminary showing of a 
breach of that duty, courts have required disclosure of some attorney-
client communications implementing the duty to preserve.21 For 
example, attorneys and clients have been deposed or otherwise 
required to disclose their actions in preserving-or failing to 
preserve-relevant material. 22 What do these decisions mean for 
counsel and their clients when faced with actual or potential 
litigation? Can they move forward with confidence that their 
implementation communications will be protected from disclosure? 
Or must they now assume that, at least with respect to the 
preservation and production of discoverable materials, some, or 
perhaps all, of their communications are themselves subject to 
discovery? 
of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves 
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully 
informed by the client."); Fisherv. United States, 425 U.S. 391,403-04 (1976) 
("Confidential disclosures by a client to an attorney made in order to obtain legal 
assistance are privileged. The purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to 
make full disclosure to their attorneys." (citations omitted». 
18. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947). 
19. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3). 
20. Id. 
21. See, e.g., Peskoffv. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54 (D.D.C. 2007); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg 
LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg 
LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); United Med. Supply Co. v. 
United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257 (2007). 
22. See, e.g., Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545 (D. Minn. 1989). 
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D. Scope o/This Inquiry 
This article examines recent decisions holding that a client's 
preservation actions are discoverable, and that some attorney-client 
communications are discoverable and may be considered in 
connection with a spoliation claim based on a preliminary showing of 
a breach of the duty to preserve information.23 To set the framework, 
the article begins with the principle that, absent a showing of breach 
of duty, attorneys' implementation communications with their clients, 
and the steps taken by attorneys to preserve relevant materials, are 
not discoverable; however, the steps a client takes to implement that 
duty are discoverable.24 This article then turns to those decisions that 
have permitted discovery of attorney-client implementation 
communications, in order to identify under what circumstances the 
discovery was permitted and the rationales for permitting that 
discovery.25 Finally, the outer boundaries of that type of discovery 
will be explored.26 
II. THE PRIVILEGE, WORK PRODUCT, AND THE DUTY TO 
PRESERVE 
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege Protects Communications Related 
to Legal Advice 
It is generally assumed that confidential communications involving 
legal advice between an attorney and client are privileged.27 This 
privilege is firmly grounded in public policy,28 and the privilege is so 
important to the functioning of the adversarial system, that Congress 
currently is considering legislation that will prohibit government 
agencies from making waiver of the privilege a "precondition" for 
23. See infra Parts Ill-IV. 
24. See infra Part IV.A-B. 
25. See infra Part V. 
26. See infra Part VI. 
27. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("The attorney-client 
privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the 
common law." (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 2290 
(McNaughton rev. vol. 1961))). 
28. Id. at 389; Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (noting the privilege is based 
on the "necessity, in the interest... of justice, of the aid of persons having 
knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely 
and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of 
disclosure"); see also Ehrlich v. Grove, 396 Md. 550, 576 (2007) (stating that the 
attorney-client privilege is a "cornerstone" of the legal system). 
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lenient treatment by government prosecutors in criminal cases.29 
Furthermore, a proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence is designed to ensure that the inadvertent production of 
privileged material in litigation will not cause a waiver of the 
privilege.3D 
Nevertheless, not all communications between counsel and client 
are privileged.3) In Fisher v. United States,32 for example, the 
Supreme Court wrote that the privilege "protects only those 
disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice which might 
not have been made absent the privilege.,,33 For a communication to 
be privileged, it must be for the purpose of seeking or providing legal 
advice,34 and it protects the client's communication of information to 
29. See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, H.R. 3013, II0th 
Congo (2007); see generally Paul & Baron, supra note 13, at ~ 61 (generally 
discussing pending legislation and Federal Rule of Evidence 502). The House Bill 
was recently approved by a two-thirds majority and the Senate Bill is pending before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Library of Congress, Summary and Status of 
H.R. 3013, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquerylz?dllO:HR03013:@@@X (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2008). 
30. See Proposed FED. R. EVID. 502, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rulesIEV_502_Rev_Note.pdf. Maryland has amended its 
similar rule. See MD. R. 2-402; Court of Appeals of Maryland Rules Order, 158th 
Report, 11-22 (Dec. 4, 2007), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules/ 
rodocs/ro I 58.pdf. 
31. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he 
attorney must have been engaged or consulted by the client for the purpose of 
obtaining legal services or advice services or advice that a lawyer may perform or 
give in his capacity as a lawyer, not in some other capacity. A communication is not 
privileged simply because it is made by or to a person who happens to be a lawyer."). 
32. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
33. ld. at 403 (emphasis added). 
34. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,394-95 (1981); Meredith, 572 F.2d at 
601-02; McCafferty's, Inc. v. Bank of Glen Burnie, 179 F.R.D. 163, 166 (D. Md. 
1998); see also Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 220 F.R.D. 264, 272 (E.D. Va. 
2004) ("To meet its burden on the attorney-client privilege claim, [the claimant] must 
show ... that: (I) the asserted holder of the privilege is or has sought to become a 
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the 
bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is 
acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was 
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of 
securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance 
in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; 
and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client." 
(emphasis added)). 
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the lawyer for the purpose of obtaining that legal advice.35 Thus, by 
extension, when the lawyer interviews client personnel and gathers 
information that is "part and parcel of legal advice given by the 
lawyer,,,36 those communications are privileged.37 
B. The Work Product Doctrine Protects Counsel's Communications 
and Activities Undertaken Because of Litigation 
The work-product doctrine has its origins in Hickman v. Taylor,38 
where the Supreme Court held that "lawyer" materials prepared in 
anticipation39 of litigation should not be subject to discovery by the 
opposing party, stating: 
[I]t is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of 
privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties 
and their counsel. Proper preparation of a client's case 
demands that he assemble information, sift what he 
considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare 
his legal theories and ;lan his strategy without undue and 
needless interference.4 
However, the Supreme Court did not grant absolute protection for 
the "[w]ork product of [a] lawyer," noting that relevant, 
nonprivileged facts could not be hidden by an attorney and that there 
could be circumstances under which an adversary could establish 
adequate reasons to justify intruding into that work prodUCt.41 
In the federal courts, the work product protection is embodied in 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), which distinguishes fact 
from opinion work product.42 Fact work product can be discoverable 
35. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n. v. Glaxo Smith Kline, 294 F.3d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 
2002). 
36. EDNA SELAN EpSTEIN, THE ArrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT 
DOCTRINE 244 (ABA 4th ed. 2004). 
37. See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390-91; United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1297 
(9th Cir. 1996); see also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Massaro, No. ClV. A. 97-2022,2000 
WL 1176541, at *8 (D.N.]. Aug. 11, 2000) (enjoining in-house counsel from 
disclosing client confidences and privileged information, including the shredding of 
documents that led to an investigation of the client). 
38. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
39. The duty to preserve relevant materials is a duty that arises because of pending or 
anticipated litigation. The duty to preserve and the work-product doctrine share this 
common basis. 
40. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11. 
41. Id. at 511-12. 
42. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see also Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. 
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upon a showing of substantial need and that the same infonnation 
cannot be obtained from another source without undue hardship.43 
Opinion work product, on the other hand, is almost always protected 
from disclosure.44 
C. The Duty to Preserve Potentially Relevant Information 
Incorporates a Duty to Communicate 
In our adversary system, characterized by broad discovery in civil 
litigation, the duty to preserve relevant infonnation is critical to the 
truth-finding function and the integrity of the judicial process.45 As a 
result, parties have long had a common-law duty to preserve 
infonnation relevant to the litigation.46 
The range and limit of the duty to preserve is addressed in many 
decisions, and is beyond the scope of this article.47 The duty rests on 
43. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3); e.g., Maertin v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 
143,150 (D.N.J. 1997). 
44. See Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 734 (4th 
Cir. 1974); Trustmark Ins. Co. v. General & Cologne Life Re of Am., No. 00 C 1926, 
2000 WL 1898518, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2000) (finding that protection of an 
attorney's opinion work product is almost absolute). 
45. See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text. 
46. See, e.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001); In re 
Sept. 11th Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, 243 F.R.D. 114, 125, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
("Discovery is run largely by attorneys, and the court and the judicial process depend 
upon honesty and fair dealing among attorneys. . .. Zurich, as the lead insurer on the 
case, and its attorneys, as lead counsel in the proceedings before me, owed the Court 
and the public better conduct than the conduct described herein .... "); Thompson v. 
U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 99-100 (D. Md. 2003); Trigon 
Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 286 (E.D. Va. 2001) ("Though the Fourth 
Circuit has not specifically spoken to the duty to preserve evidence... it is a 
necessary predicate of the controlling Fourth Circuit decisions that such a duty exists, 
because, without such an obligation, there would be no wrongdoing in destroying 
relevant documents."); Winters v. Textron, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 518, 520 (M.D. Pa. 
1999) ("A duty to preserve evidence ... arises when there is (1) pending or probable 
litigation involving the defendant; (2) knowledge of the existence or likelihood of 
litigation, (3) foreseeable prejudice to the other party if the evidence were to be 
discarded and (4) evidence relevant to the litigation." (citation omitted); Joseph 
Gallagher, E-ethics: The Ethical Dimension of the Electronic Discovery Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 613, 617-18 
(2007) ("[T]his [duty to preserve] creates an affirmative duty on outside counsel to 
investigate the document retention policies of their clients during the earliest stages 
of representation. Indeed, lawyers who advise their clients on the creation of a 
document-retention policy, as well as in-house counsel charged with managing that 
policy, have an ethical obligation to do so in a way that does not obstruct justice." 
(footnotes omitted». 
47. For a discussion of the scope of the duty to preserve, see Grimm et aI., supra note 16. 
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both the attorney and the client.48 The duty to preserve potentially 
relevant information includes, and is effectuated by, a reciprocal duty 
to communicate.49 Counsel's duty to communicate with clients about 
the preservation of discoverable materials has been articulated by the 
American Bar Association,50 and in a variety of court decisions.51 
For example, in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V),52 the 
court based its decision finding that there was a failure to preserve on 
"counsel's obligation to ensure that relevant information is preserved 
by giving clear instructions to the client to preserve such information 
and, perhaps more importantly, a client's obligation to heed those 
instructions,,,53 and enjoined counsel and clients "to communicate 
clearly and effectively with one another to ensure that litigation 
48. See, e.g., Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 
66932, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), vacated and remanded in part, No. 05CV1958-
RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008); Thompson v. Jiffy Lube 
Intern., Inc., 2007 WL 608343, at *5 (D. Kan. Feb. 22, 2007) (holding that, where 
counsel's computer crashed, counsel was ordered to submit affidavit); Telecom Int'I 
Am., Ltd. v. AT&T Corp., 189 F.R.D. 76, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Once [a party is] on 
notice, the obligation to preserve evidence runs first to counsel, who then has a duty 
to advise and explain to the client its obligations to retain pertinent documents that 
may be relevant to the litigation."); Thomas Y. Allman, Managing Preservation 
Obligations After the 2006 Federal E-Discovery Amendments, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 
9, ~ 22 (2007), http://law.richmond.eduijoltlv13i3/article9.pdf ("Some decisions 
imply that counsel owes an independent duty to a court to actively supervise a party's 
compliance with preservation obligations.") (citing, inter alia, Zubulake V, 229 
F.R.D. 422, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[Clounsel [both employed counsel and outside 
counsel] [are] responsible for coordinating her client's discovery efforts. In this case, 
counsel failed to properly oversee UBS in a number of important ways, both in terms 
of its duty to locate relevant information and its duty to preserve and timely produce 
that information." (alterations in original)); Gregory G. Wrobel, Andrew M. Gardner 
& Michael J. Waters, Counsel Beware: Preventing Spoliation of Electronic Evidence 
in Antitrust Litigation, 20 ANTITRUST 79, 80 (2006) ("[Other cases] do not address 
in the same depth the separate duty-if any--of counsel to locate and preserve 
relevant electronic information.")). Under appropriate circumstances, the duty may 
shift to the client, and it does not appear to be a non-delegable duty. Zubulake V, 229 
F.R.D. at 425-26. 
49. See Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 424 ("The conduct of both counsel and client thus 
calls to mind the now-famous words of the prison captain in Cool Hand Luke: 'What 
we've got here is a failure to communicate.'" (citation omitted)). 
50. ABA CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS, No. 10 (August 2004) ("When a lawyer who has 
been retained to handle a matter learns that litigation is probable or has been 
commenced, the lawyer should inform the client of its duty to preserve potentially 
relevant documents .... "). 
51. See, e.g., Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422; Telecom Int'l, 189 F.R.D. at 81. 
52. 229 F.R.D. 422. 
53. Id. at 424. 
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proceeds efficiently."s4 The duty runs both ways, and clients have a 
duty to communicate with their attorneys. In Wachtel v. Guardian 
Life Ins.,ss the court found that the defendants "violated the integrity 
of this [c]ourt's judicial processes by: ... (10) keeping even their 
own outside counsel... unaware of their e-mail procedures that 
resulted in widespread dereliction of their discovery obligations.,,56 
Recently, in Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.,S7 the court noted: 
For the current "good faith" discovery system to function in 
the electronic age, attorneys and clients must work together 
to ensure that both understand how and where electronic 
documents, records and emails are maintained and to 
determine how best to locate, review, and produce 
responsive documents. Attorneys must take responsibility 
for ensuring that their clients conduct a comprehensive and 
appropriate document search. 58 
In short, the duty to preserve incorporates a duty to engage III 
effective attorney-client communication. 
III. DISCOVERABILITY OF A CLIENT'S ACTIONS 
IMPLEMENTING THE DUTY TO PRESERVE 
It is axiomatic that an opponent may routinely obtain discovery of a 
client's actions taken to implement the duty to preserve information. 
As set forth below, this is no different than the traditional "paper 
54. Id. 
55. Nos. 01-4183 (FSH), 03-1801(FSH), 2007 WL 1752036 (D.NJ. June 18,2007). 
56. Id. at *8. 
57. No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), vacated and 
remanded in part, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 
2008). In addition to addressing counsel's duty to communicate to the client, 
Qua/camm also addressed the client's duty to communicate with counsel: 
Qualcomm also has not presented any evidence that outside 
counsel knew enough about Qualcomm's organization and 
operation to identify all of the individuals whose computers 
should be searched and determine the most knowledgeable 
witness. And, more importantly, Qualcomm is a large corporation 
with an extensive legal staff; it clearly had the ability to identify 
the correct witnesses and determine the correct computers to 
search and search terms to use. Qualcomm just lacked the desire 
to do so. 
Id. at *11 n.6. 
58. Id. at *9. 
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discovery" paradigm of asking a deponent to describe his or her 
search for responsive paper documents. 
It is of no moment that the paper or electronic search was 
conducted at the direction of counsel. Parties are permitted to inquire 
into an opponent's efforts to preserve relevant information through 
interrogatories and in depositions directed to the opposing client.59 In 
the ESI context, this is exemplified by In re eBay Seller Antitrust 
L ·· . 60 ltlgatzan. 
In eBay, the parties were locked in acrimonious "discovery about 
discovery,,,61 in which the plaintiff demanded the production of 
defendant's litigation hold notices (termed "document retention 
notices," or DRNs, by eBay) in order to determine whether eBay had 
preserved relevant electronic information.62 eBay refused to produce 
the DRNs, claiming that they had been "drafted by in-house counsel 
in consultation with outside counsel and were expressly labeled as 
'Attorney-Client Privileged & Confidential '" and that they contained 
information "protected by either the privilege or work product 
doctrine with respect to counsel's analysis of plaintiffs' claims in this 
litigation.,,63 In response, the court ruled that: 
eBay need not produce copies of the DRNs nor any 
information about matters contained therein that are 
privileged or constitute work product. Plaintiffs, however, 
are entitled to inquire into the facts as to what the employees 
receiving the DRNs have done in response; i.e., what efforts 
they have undertaken to collect and preserve applicable 
information.64 
The court went on to define the appropriate boundaries for 
plaintiff's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition inquiry into eBay's steps to 
identify and preserve relevant evidence: 
Although plaintiffs may not be entitled to probe into what 
exactly eBay's employees were told by its attorneys, they 
are certainly entitled to know what eBay's employees are 
59. See, e.g., In re Triton Energy Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 5:98CV256, 2002 WL 32114464, 
at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 7,2002) (noting Triton's witnesses testified in deposition that 
they had not been asked by Triton's counsel to produce or preserve documents). 
60. No. C 07-01882 JF (RS), 2007 WL 2852364 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2007); accord 
Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
61. eBay, 2007 WL 2852364, at *1 n.l. 
62. Id. at * 1. 
63. Id. at *2. 
64. Id. at * 1. 
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doing with respect to collecting and preserving ESI. 
Furthermore, because it would neither be reasonable nor 
practical to require or even to permit plaintiffs to depose all 
600 employees [who received the litigation hold notice], it is 
appropriate to permit plaintiffs to discover what those 
employees are supposed to be doing. Even though such 
inquiry may, indirectly, implicate communications from 
counsel to the employees, the focus can and should be on 
the facts of what eBay's document retention and collection 
policies are, rather than on any details of the [litigation hold 
letter]. ... [P]laintiffs are entitled to know what kinds and 
categories of ESI eBay employees were instructed to 
preserve and collect, and what s~ecific actions they were 
instructed to undertake to that end. 5 
427 
eBay stands for the proposition that the steps taken by a client to 
implement a litigation hold are discoverable, without any showing of 
need, loss of ESI, or otherwise. Quite simply, those steps are both 
relevant and unprivileged. As noted, however, the eBay court did 
not, on the facts presented, permit discovery of counsel's litigation 
hold instructions to the client.66 
IV. DISCOVERABILITY OF COUNSEL'S COMMUNICATIONS 
IN FULFILLING THE DUTY TO PRESERVE 
Absent a preliminary showing of a failure to preserve that which 
should have been preserved, courts have generally refused to permit 
discovery of counsel's communications related to the preservation of 
information.67 Courts have permitted such discovery, however, when 
confronted with a showing of a failure to preserve.68 
A. Absent a Preliminary Showing of a Failure to Preserve That 
Which Should Have Been Preserved, Courts Have Generally 
Refused to Permit Discovery of Counsel's Communications 
Related to the Preservation of Information 
As noted above, in eBay, the court ruled that, "eBay need not 
produce copies of the DRNs [drafted by counsel] nor any information 
65. Id. at *2 (footnote omitted). 
66. Jd. 
67. E.g., Gibson v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1123-24 (N.D. Ga. 2007) 
(refusing discovery of litigation hold notice as work product); see also India 
Brewing, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 237 F.R.D. 190, 194 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (holding 
document retention policy irrelevant in absence of showing of failure to preserve). 
68. See, e.g., Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 551-53 (D. Minn. 1989). 
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about matters contained therein that are privileged or constitute work 
product. ,,69 The court, however, left open the question of whether the 
litigation hold notice was protected by the privilege or work product 
d . 70 octnne. 
In Muro v. Target Corp}! the court reached a similar conclusion. 
The court wrote: 
Muro's fifth objection is to the Magistrate Judge's ruling 
that Target's "litigation hold" notices are subject to the 
attorney-client privilege and to work product protection. 
But Muro makes no argument as to what error the 
Magistrate Judge made in classifying the notices as 
privileged, after conducting an in camera review of the 
documents, other than to say that she finds it "incredible" 
that the documents would contain privileged information. 
The court has examined the litigation hold notices in 
camera. Each seem to be communications of legal advice 
from corporate counsel to corporate employees regarding 
document preservation. As the litigation hold notices, on 
their face, appear to be privileged material, there is no basis 
for finding that the Magistrate Judge clearly erred, nor any 
need to address Muro's argument that work ~roduct 
protection is overcome here by her showing of need. 
Similarly, in Gibson v. Ford Motor Co./3 the court explained why 
litigation hold notices sent by an attorney to a client were not 
discoverable: 
In the Court's experience, these instructions are often, if not 
always, drafted by counsel, involve their work product, are 
often overly inclusive, and the documents they list do not 
necessarily bear a reasonable relationship to the issues in 
litigation. This is not a document relating to the 
Defendant's business. Rather, the document relates 
exclusively to this litigation, was apparently created after 
this dispute arose, and exists for the sole purpose of assuring 
compliance with discovery that may be required in this 
69. eBay, 2007 WL 2852364, at * 1. 
70. Id. at *2 n.3. ("Whether the privilege or work product protection would apply to 
instructions regarding document retention or collection is far from certain. In light of 
the conclusions reached in the remainder of this order, however, the Court need not 
decide that question at this time.") 
71. No. 04 C 6267, 2007 WL 3254463 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2007). 
72. Id. at *9 (citations omitted). 
73. 510 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (N.D. Ga. 2007). 
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litigation. Not only is the document likely to constitute 
attorney work-product, but its compelled production could 
dissuade other businesses from issuing such instructions in 
the event of litigation. 74 
Other recent decisions recognize the protected status of litigation 
hold notices, including Kin9:sway Financial Services, Inc. v. Price 
Waterhouse-Coopers LLP, 5 Turner v. Resort Condominiums 
International/6 and Capitano v. Ford Motor Co.77 In these decisions, 
with greater or lesser analysis, courts declined requests to order that 
litigation hold notices be produced.78 In summary, absent a showing 
of a breach of the duty to preserve, attorney-client preservation 
communications have not been discoverable and were held to be 
either privileged or work product. 
B. Upon a Showing of a Breach of the Duty to Preserve, Some 
Attorney-Client Communications Relating to the Implementation 
of the Duty to Preserve Are Discoverable 
Faced with a failure to preserve information that should have been 
preserved, courts have considered attorney-client communications in 
addressing spoliation issues. Preceding Zubulake V, Judge Shira 
Scheindlin issued a series of decisions addressing defendant UBS's 
74. Id. at 1123. It is noteworthy that in Gibson, unlike Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D 422, 426 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), the requesting party did not make a preliminary showing that ESI 
had not been preserved. Gibson, 510 F. Supp. at 1123. 
75. No. 03 Civ. 5560 RMB HBP, 2006 WL 1520227, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2006) 
(denying motion to compel production of litigation hold notice and holding that 
failure to list the notice on privilege log did not waive the privilege). 
76. No. I:03-cv-2025-DFH-WTL, 2006 WL 1990379, at *7-8 (S.D. Ind. July 13,2006) 
(denying motion to compel production of litigation hold notice which defendant 
claimed was privileged). 
77. 831 N.Y.S.2d 687,688-89 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (noting that '''suspension orders' 
may lead to the production of admissible evidence and are, therefore, relevant" but 
holding that they "are privileged communications from attorney to client which relate 
to legal advice given by counsel to client and, as such, are protected as attorney-client 
privileged documents"). 
78. The decision in India Brewing, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 237 F.R.D. 190 (E.D. 
Wis. 2006), presents an interesting comparison to the "litigation hold" cases. In 
India Brewing, the court held that, because there was no evidence of failure to 
preserve infonnation, the responding party's document retention policy was 
irrelevant and not discoverable. Id. at 192. It wrote that "IBI has failed to persuade 
the court that the document retention policy ... is relevant to any claim or defense 
alleged in the pleadings. Thus, the motion to compel production of the document 
retention policy will be denied." Id. 
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failure to preserve relevant ESI. 79 The detail with which the court 
considered the communications between UBS and its counsel is 
illustrated in the following passage: 
Fully aware of their common law duty to preserve relevant 
evidence, UBS's in-house attorneys gave oral instructions in 
August 2001-immediately after Zubulake filed her EEOC 
charge-instructing employees not to destroy or delete 
material potentially relevant to Zubulake's claims, and in 
fact to segregate such material into separate files for the 
lawyers' eventual review. This warning pertained to both 
electronic and hard-copy files, but did not specifically 
pertain to so-called "backup tapes," maintained by UBS' s 
information technology personnel. In particular, UBS's in-
house counsel, Robert L. Salzberg, "advised relevant UBS 
employees to preserve and tum over to counsel all files, 
records or other written memoranda or documents 
concerning the allegations raised in the [EEOC] charge or 
any aspect of [Zubulake's] employment." Subsequently-
but still in August 2001 - UBS' s outside counsel met with a 
number of the key players in the litigation and reiterated Mr. 
Salzberg's instructions, reminding them to preserve relevant 
documents, "including e-mails." Salzberg reduced these 
instructions to writing in e-mails dated February 22, 2002 -
immediately after Zubulake filed her complaint - and 
September 25, 2002. Finally, in August 2002, after 
Zubulake propounded a document request that specifically 
called for e-mails stored on backup tapes, UBS's outside 
counsel instructed UBS information technology personnel to 
stop recycling backup tapes. Every UBS employee 
mentioned in this Opinion (with the exception of Mike 
Davies) either personally spoke to UBS's outside counsel 
about the duty to preserve e-mails, or was a recipient of one 
of Salzberg's e-mails.8o 
The Zubulake V court considered the fact that: UBS's "counsel 
instructed UBS's information technology personnel that backup tapes 
79. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake II), 230 F.R.D. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
80. Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D 422, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (alterations in original) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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were also subject to the litigation hold;,,81 UBS's counsel "advised 
UBS's infonnation technology personnel to locate and retain all 
existing backup tapes for employees identified by plaintiff;" and 
UBS's counsel "re-emphasized that directive and confinned that 
these tapes continued to be preserved both orally and in writing on 
several subsequent occasions. ,,82 The court referred to specific 
conversations between UBS's outside counsel and key UBS 
employees by date,83 and reviewed other attorney-client 
communications in detail sufficient to pennit it to conclude that there 
were "clear and repeated warnings of counsel.,,84 
The Zubulake V court did not sto~ there. It. also considered what 
UBS's counsel did not say to UBS. It noted that counsel "failed to 
request retained infonnation from one key employee and to give the 
litigation hold instructions to another" and that counsel "failed to 
adequately communicate with another employee about . . . how she 
maintained her computer files," and "failed to safeguard backup tapes 
that might have contained some of the deleted e-mails.,,86 And, 
finally, the court inferred the content of attorney-client 
communications from the production of materials based upon client 
conduct.s7 
The Zubulake V court relied on several decisions in which attorney-
client communications were considered in evaluating a party's 
preservation efforts. For example, the court cited Keir v. 
UnumProvident Corp., 88 in which certain electronic records were 
81. Id. at 427. "In August 2002, after Zubulake specifically requested e-mail stored on 
backup tapes, UBS's outside counsel orally instructed UBS's information technology 
personnel to stop recycling backup tapes." Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 215. 
82. Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 425 n.15 (citation omitted). 
83. Id. at 434-35. 
84. Id. at 426. 
85. See id. at 424. 
86. Id. 
87. See id. at 429 (discussing the witness's production of responsive e-mails shortly after 
the witness testified in deposition about the substance of her preservation-related 
communications with counsel). 
88. No. 02 Civ. 8781(DLC), 2003 WL 21997747 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2003), cited in 
Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 434. In addition to Keir, the Zubulake V court provides a 
brief overview of cases dealing with counsel's obligation to preserve evidence. See, 
e.g., Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 433 n.80 (citing Telecom Int'l Am., Ltd. v. AT&T 
Corp., 189 F.R.D. 76, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Once on notice [that evidence is 
relevant], the obligation to preserve evidence runs first to counsel, who then has a 
duty to advise and explain to the client its obligations to retain pertinent documents 
that may be relevant to the litigation.") (citing Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. 
Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12,18 (D. Neb. 1983))); id. at 434 n.87 (citing Metro. 
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erased, triggering discovery about discovery.89 In considering 
whether spoliation had occurred, the Keir court considered a series of 
attorney-client communications, including an email from the legal 
department to a UnumProvident employee,90 an oral communication 
from a UnumProvident employee to the legal department,91 the law 
department's forwarding of a court order to corporate staff,92 and a 
conference call between counsel and staff. 93 The court ordered 
"UnumProvident ... to provide ... an affidavit from one or more 
witnesses of the defendants or its counsel who had firsthand 
knowledge" of facts pertinent to the 10ss.94 At the court-ordered 
evidentiary hearing on the loss of the data, "UnumProvident invoked 
its attorney-client privilege to protect most of its communications 
concerning the issues addressed at the hearing.,,95 The court was 
nonetheless able to ascertain that UnumProvident had failed to 
communicate specific preservation instructions to its agent, IBM, 
resulting in loss of the data.96 Thus, in Keir, attorney-client 
implementation communications were explored; however, the court 
did not conduct a full-scale inquiry into areas covered by the 
privilege. 
Zubulake V and Keir do not stand alone. For example, in Cache La 
Poudre Feeds, Inc. v. Land 0 'Lakes,97 the court considered without 
comment the_communications and actions of counsel: 
Opera Ass'n. v. Local 100, Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union, 212 
F.R.D. 178,222 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (ordering default judgment against defendant as a 
discovery sanction because "counsel (I) never gave adequate instructions to their 
clients about the clients' overall discovery obligations, [including] what constitutes a 
'document' ... ; (2) knew the Union to have no document retention or filing systems 
and yet never implemented a systematic procedure for document production or for 
retention of documents, including electronic documents; (3) delegated document 
production to a layperson who ... was not instructed by counsel[ ] that a document 
included a draft or other nonidentical copy, a computer file and an e-mail; ... and 
(5) ... failed to ask important witnesses for documents until the night before their 
depositions and, instead, made repeated, baseless representations that all documents 
had been produced.")). 
89. Keir, 2003 WL 21997747, at *1. 
90. Id. at *6. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at *7. 
93. Id. at *8. 
94. Id. at *1 0 (emphasis added). 
95. Id. at *11 n.3. 
96. See id. at *5-6. 
97. 244 F.R.D. 614 (D. Colo. 2007). 
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In this case, Land O'Lakes's General Counsel and retained 
counsel failed in many respects to discharge their 
obligations to coordinate and oversee discovery. 
Admittedly, in-house counsel established a litigation hold 
shortly after the lawsuit commenced and communicated that 
fact to Land O'Lakes employees who were believed to 
possess relevant materials. However, by his own admission, 
Land O'Lakes' General Counsel took no independent action 
to verify the completeness of the employees' document 
production. As [general counsel] explained, he simply 
assumed that the materials he received were complete and 
the product of a thorough search. While [general counsel] 
presumed that e-mails generated by former employees 
would be located on shared computer drives utilized by 
current employees, he made no effort to verify that 
assumption. Without validating the accuracy and 
completeness of its discovery production, Land. O'Lakes 
continued its routine practice of wiping clean the computer 
hard drives for former employees. Under the circumstances 
and without some showing of a reasonable inquiry, it is 
difficult to understand how Defendants' retained counsel 
could legitimately claim on July 7, 2005 that Land O'Lakes 
had "made every effort to produce all documentation and 
provide all relevant information. ,,98 
433 
These problems persuaded the court to authorize a deposition of 
Land O'Lakes's counsel: "I permitted Plaintiff to take a Rule 
30(b)(6) deposition to explore the procedures Land O'Lakes took to 
identify, preserve and produce ... responsive documents. Mr. Janzen 
[the attorney] testified that he instructed employees to produce all ... 
documents responsive to discovery requests served in the PROFILE 
litigation. ,,99 
In reviewing the evidence, the court noted that "Mr. Janzen [the 
attorney] did not have a full understanding of his company's 
computer systems or the process for creating computer back-up 
tapes,"IOO and that "Mr. Janzen conceded that no attempt was made to 
verify whether anyone actually reviewed the [company] website for 
responsive materials."lol Thus, the court considered counsel's 
instructions to his client's employees, and whether counsel had a 
98. Jd. at 630 (citation omitted). 
99. Id. at 634. 
100. Jd. at 628. 
10 1. Id. at 632. 
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"full understanding" of his client's computer systems. 102 As in 
Zubulake V, the court's rationale for requiring disclosure of attorney-
client communications relating to the duty to preserve appears to rest 
on the presumption that counsel had a duty to establish a litigation 
hold and oversee discovery. 103 
Similarly, in United Medical Supply Co. v. United States,104 the 
U.S. Court of Federal Claims, faced with the government's 
inadequate document retention and undisputed destruction of 
documents in violation of the duty to preserve,105 engaged in a 
comprehensive examination of the preservation communications 
between the two government attorne~s responsible for identifying 
and preserving relevant materials. lo It then closely analyzed 
discussions between another government attorney, Mr. Chadwick, 
and a government paralegal, Mr. Brown, about "collecting responsive 
documents from all the facilities involved in this matter," and secured 
the affidavit testimony of Mr. Chadwick that he had instructed Mr. 
Brown "to gather and produce all available records of the medical 
treatment facilities relating to alleged diverted purchases of medical 
and surgical supplies.,,107 Faced with multiple preservation failures, 
the court wrote: 
In light of these serious allegations, . . . the court ordered 
defendant to file two additional affidavits: one by Mr. 
Chadwick and the other by Mr. Brown, detailing their 
conversations regarding Mr. Brown's search for documents. 
The court also ordered defendant to file copies of any 
general notices sent, either in paper or electronic form, by 
defendant to all affected [medical treatment facilities] 
requesting or relating to the preservation of relevant 
documents. 108 
In short, after being presented with a breach of the duty to preserve, 
the court probed attorney-client communications and attorney-
paralegal discussions, and demanded production of the government's 
102. ld. at 634. 
103. ld. at 629-30. 
104. 77 Fed. Cl. 257 (2007). 
105. ld. at 264, 273-74. 
106. ld. at 260. 
107. ld. at 260-61. 
108. ld. at 262. 
2008] Discovery About Discovery 435 
litigation hold notices, even though the failure to preserve was not 
intentional, but a result of mere negligence. I 09 
These decisions are in accord with Guideline No. 9 of the Sedona 
Conference Commentary on Legal Holds, which notes that a legal 
hold policy and the process of implementation of that policy "may be 
subject to scrutiny by the opposing party and review by the COurt."IIO 
The Sedona Conference Commentary reflects a growing trend in 
litigation where one party alleges that another party has failed to 
satisfy its duty to preserve. III The Sedona Conference Commentary 
to Guideline No.9 advises that: 
Considering issues regarding work product and attomey-
client privilege, the [litigation hold] documentation need not 
disclose strategy or legal analysis. However, sufficient 
documentation should be included to demonstrate to 
opposing parties and the court that the legal hold was 
implemented in a reasonable, consistent and good faith 
manner should there be a need to defend the process. 112 
The Commentary goes on to note: 
While it may never be necessary to disclose this [litigation 
hold] information, or disclosure may be made only to the 
court in camera to preserve privileged legal advice and 
work product information, the availability of documentation 
[of creation and implementation of the litigation hold] will 
preserve the option of the party to disclose the information 
in the event a challenge to the preservation efforts .is 
raised. I 13 
In short, when there is a need to defend the preservation process, 
the Sedona litigation hold guidelines contemplate that courts may 
inquire into implementation of the legal hold and that the inquiry may 
109. Jd. at 272-74. 
110. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT RETENTION 
& PRODUCTION, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON LEGAL HOLDS: THE 
TRIGGER AND THE PROCESS 4 guideline 9 (drft. ed. 2007), available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/contentimiscFiles/Legal_holds.pdf [hereinafter 
LEGAL HOLDS]' Guideline No. 5 of the Sedona Conference Commentary on Legal 
Holds discusses judicial evaluation of "an organization's legal hold decision." See 
id. at 10. 
Ill. See id. at 5-7, 15. 
112. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
113. Id. at 16. 
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require the disclosure of some attorney-client communications. 114 
The Sedona guidelines suggest that parties and their counsel should 
not include legal strategy or legal advice in the legal hold notice, so 
as to ensure continued protection for that information. I 15 
In the Sedona guidelines, and in each of these and many other 
cases, 116 when faced with evidence that a party had failed to preserve 
relevant ESI, courts considered some attorney-client communications 
114. See id. at 15-16. 
115. ld. 
116. Id.; see, e.g., Peskoffv. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54, 55 (D.D.C. 2007) ("In response to my 
order, Faber's counsel submitted an affidavit that described the previously conducted 
search for emails."); In re Sept. 11th Liab. Ins. Coverage Cases, 243 F.R.D. 114,117, 
120 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[Plaintiffs] allege that the positions that Zurich took in its 
pleadings, motions, and other papers were objectively unreasonable, in violation of 
Rule 11, and that Zurich produced certain documents much later than they were 
required to produce the documents, and destroyed other documents, in violation of 
Rule 37. These allegations require the Court to consider what Zurich and its lawyers 
knew, when they knew it, and whether such knowledge rendered their pleadings, 
motions, and conduct during discovery subject to sanctions .... On January 7, 2002, 
Thomas W. Brunner, a partner at the law firm of Wiley Rein LLP, then known as 
Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP, who became the lead lawyer for the insurance 
companies in the case before me, met with primary liability and excess liability 
underwriters and instructed that 'all communications relating to [the] situation should 
be preserved, including communications that would be discarded in the ordinary 
course of business.'" (citation omitted)); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc., 439 F. 
Supp. 2d 524, 545 (E.D. Va. 2006) ("To help accomplish these corporate objectives, 
Karp, in January 1998, telephoned Diane Savage, a partner at the law firm Cooley 
Godward. Karp told Savage that 'he was working at Rambus, and that he was 
looking for some litigation-somebody to provide him with litigation assistance.' In 
response to that request, Savage asked Dan Johnson, a litigation partner at Cooley 
Godward, to meet with Karp."); Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., No. 98 C 
7482,2000 WL 1694325, at *13-14, *39-40 (N.D. lll. Oct. 23, 2000) (considering 
statements by outside attorneys to board and failure of in-house attorney to take 
certain actions); School-Link Techs., Inc. v. Applied Res., Inc., No. 05-2088-JWL, 
2007 WL 677647, at *4-5 (D. Kan. Feb. 28, 2007) (considering deposition testimony 
that defendant's "key player" employee was never contacted by counselor instructed 
to preserve information, and considering affidavit that defense counsel instructed 
defendant to preserve and gather documents, resulting in collection of more than 
7,500 pages); cf Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-
5340 JF(RS), 2007 WL 1848665, at *2, n.4 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2007) ("The Flynn 
and Charno declarations also both state that they received such [preservation] 
instructions from American Blind's counsel. The inclusion of such statements is 
curious given the Court's express instruction that the declarants could and should 
state what they did [to preserve evidence] without disclosing communications with 
counsel." (emphasis omitted)). 
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in resolving whether the duty to preserve had been violated. 1I7 In 
each of these cases, the courts appear to have limited their inquiry to 
consideration of attorney-client communications focused on the 
implementation of the duty to preserve and not on legal advice or 
litigation strategy. I IS The courts, however, generally did not provide 
the rationale for their consideration of attorney-client 
communications. I 19 
C. One Justification for Considering Attorney-Client 
Communications When There Has Been a Breach of the Duty to 
Preserve is the Crime, Fraud, or Tort Exception to the Privilege 
The crime, fraud, or tort exception'20 to the privilege will abrogate 
claims of privilege where the client consulted with counsel in order to 
commit a crime, fraud, or tort, and the challenged communications or 
attornelt work product were "in furtherance" of that alleged crime or 
fraud. I I Courts also have applied the crime, fraud, or tort exception 
where counsel committed fraud on the court by engaging in a cover 
up of the client's prior misconduct and document destruction. 122 
117. LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 110, at 15-16; Board of Regents ofUniv. of Neb. v. BASF 
Corp., No. 4:04-CY-3356, 2007 WL 3342423, at *2, *4 (D. Neb. Nov. 5, 2007) 
(considering affidavit of counsel); Thompson v. Jiffy Lube Intern., Inc., No. 05-
1203-WEB, 2007 WL 608343, at *5 (D. Kan. Feb. 22, 2007) (covering deposition of 
counsel); Thompson v. HUD, 219 F.R.D. 93, 104 (D. Md. 2003) (noting failure of 
counsel to request preservation). 
118. LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 110, at 15-16. 
119. Id. 
120. The exception is sometimes referred to as the crime-fraud exception and sometimes 
as the "crime, fraud or tort" exception because some courts will apply the exception 
to attorney-client communications in furtherance of a tort. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that if FMC made false 
statements to the EPA after having consulted with counsel, the crime-fraud exception 
would be applied to counsel's work product); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 
540 F.2d 1215, 1221-22 (4th Cir. 1976); Berroth v. Kan. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 
Inc., 205 F.R.D. 586, 589 (D. Kan. 2002) (noting that Kansas statutorily defines the 
exception to include torts). 
121. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 (2000); Theodore 
L. Banks, Leslie Wharton, Michael R. Geske, Cheryl G. Ragsdale, Erik D. Nadolink 
& Charles R. Wall, Attorney-Client Privilege and Attorney Work Product 
Protections, in ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL, SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING 
BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 33-153 (Robert L. Haig, ed., West 2007). 
122. In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In this case, the government 
alleged that the defendant engaged in document destruction and misrepresentations 
that constituted fraud on the court. The D.C. Circuit held that client communications 
with counsel about past misconduct would be protected, but that communications that 
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Recently, in In re Grand Jury Investigation,123 the court held that 
certain attorney-client communications fell within the crime-fraud 
exception where the client used counsel's legal advice to destroy 
electronic information. 124 The court stated: 
If, with knowledge of the Government's interest in 
retrieving any remaining emails, Jane Doe continued to 
receive emails that were arguably responsive to the 
subpoena and failed to use her position as an executive of 
the Organization to direct that all email deletions stop 
immediately, she may be viewed as furthering the 
obstruction of the grand jury's investigation or the 
obstruction of justice. . .. In any event, if Jane Doe learned 
of the Government's interest in certain documents from her 
conversation with Attorney on January 20, 2005 and 
subsequently acquiesced in the deletion or destruction of 
those documents, the second prong of the crime-fraud 
exception would be satisfied. 125 
The court's reasoning here is significant because it demonstrates 
that the crime-fraud exception can be used to abrogate the privile5e even when counsel advised the client to fulfill its duty to preserve. 6 
In this case, because the government was able to show consultation 
with the attorney, and a subsequent improper deletion of email, the 
were part of a cover-up would be subject to the crime-fraud exception. Id. at 398, 
402. 
123. 445 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, Doe V. United States, 127 S. Ct. 538 
(2006). 
124. Id. at 278; see also Allman, supra note 48, at 13, ~ 23 ("Conversations about 
preservation obligations are not necessarily privileged when criminal grand jury 
investigations involving potential criminal obstruction of justice are involved." 
(citing In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d at 269». 
125. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d at 279. 
126. Application of the crime-fraud exception has never required knowing participation by 
the attorney in the client's crime or fraud. The only requirement is that counsel's 
work or advice be used by the client to engage in wrongdoing. See, e.g., Wachtel V. 
Guardian Life, Nos. 01-4183 (FSH), 03-1801(FSH), 2007 WL 1752036, at *8 
(D.N.J. June 18, 2007) ("The Health Net Defendants have violated the integrity of 
this Court's judicial processes by ... keeping even their own outside counsel ... 
unaware of their e-mail procedures that resulted in widespread dereliction of their 
discovery obligations."); Wachtel V. Health Net, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 81, 103 (D.N.J. 
2006); Samsung Elecs. CO. V. Rambus, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 524, 545 (E.D. Va. 
2006). 
2008] Discovery About Discovery 439 
Third Circuit affirmed an order enforcing the subpoena for attorney-
client communications. 127 
In Rambus v. Infineon Technologies AG,128 the court applied the 
crime, fraud, or tort exception to the destruction of ESI in a civil 
case. 129 The court held "that the crime/fraud exception extends to 
materials or communication created for planning, or in furtherance 
of, spoliation.,,13o Rambus destroyed relevant materials at a time 
when it had a duty to preserve the evidence. l3l Rambus organized a 
"shred day" and destroyed 20,000 pounds of documents. 132 In 
resolving the resulting dispute over Rambus' duty to preserve, the 
court considered attorney-client communications such as those of 
Rambus' former outside patent prosecution counsel who "testified 
that he destroyed some documents, pursuant to orders from Rambus, 
just before Rambus instituted this litigation in 2000 but before 
Rambus sent a letter to Infineon accusing it of infringement,,,133 and 
those of one of Rambus' in-house attorneys who "testified that one 
of the understood reasons behind Shred Day was that 'some of that 
stuff is discoverable. ",134 On these facts, the court found: "It is self-
evident . .. that any communication between lawyer and client 
respecting spoliation is fundamentally inconsistent with the asserted 
principles behind the recognition of the attorney-client privilege, 
namely, 'observance of law' or the 'administration of justice. ",135 In 
a subsequent decision involving Rambus, Samsung Electronics Co. v. 
Rambus,136 the trial judge who authored Rambus v. Infineon 
127. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d at 280; cf Tigard Sportsurfaces, LLC v. 
Syntennico, Inc., No. CIV. 98-1359-JE, 2000 WL 284189, at ·4 (D. Or. Mar. 10, 
2000) (denying application of crime-fraud exception to abrogate privilege where 
client erased tapes after consultation with counsel). 
128. 220 F.R.D. 264 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
129. Id. at 279. 
130. Id. at 283; accord Wachtel v. Guardian Life, 2007 WL 1752036, at ·2 (citing 
Rambus v. Infineon, 220 F.R.D. at 283); Wachtel v. Health Net, 239 F.R.D. at 103 
(noting that, "when outside counsel asked employees to search for emails in response 
to Plaintiffs' document requests and Court Orders, that counsel did not know from 
Health Net that these employees could not access 'historic' e-mail beyond the most 
current three month period."); PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND 
PRACTICE 123 (ABA 2005) ("Developing case law supports the application of the 
crime/fraud exception."). 
131. Rambus v. Infineon, 220 F.R.D. at 280. 
132. Id. at 284. 
133. Id. 
134. !d. at 285. 
135. Id. at 284. 
136. 439 F. Supp. 2d 524 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
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Technologies AG, noted that the attorney-client and work product 
privileges were pierced in Infineon. I37 Rambus v. Infineon was 
squarely Brounded on the crime, fraud, or tort exception to the 
privilege. 8 
Other courts have applied the crime, fraud, or tort exception where 
counsel's advice or work product is used to destroy relevant evidence 
or otherwise "undermines the adversary system itself.,,\39 In 
Capellupo v. FMC Corp./40 the court was faced with a situation 
where attorneys had directed destruction of evidence after the duty to 
preserve had arisen. 141 In resolving the discovery dispute, attorneys 
were deposed, their calendar entries were entered into evidence, and 
their thoughts explored. 142 
Although the crime,. fraud, or tort exception may provide 
justification for permitting discovery of attorney-client preservation 
communications in the context of a failure to preserve, that exception 
is not the only one that may be applicable nor does it appear to be the 
vehicle employed in decisions such as Zubulake V. Obviously, each 
case turns on its own unique facts. 
D. Where There Has Been a Failure to Preserve, Attorney-Client 
Communications May Be Considered if They Are Placed "In 
Issue" by the Client, if the Client Waives Any Privilege, or if 
There Are Allegations That Trigger the Attorney Self-Defense 
Doctrine 
In addition to the crime-fraud exception to the privilege, attorney-
client communications implementing the duty to preserve relevant 
material may also become discoverable under a number of waiver 
doctrines. For example, by putting counsel's actions and advice "in 
issue," the client waives any privilege or work product protection it 
would otherwise have for those communications. 143 If, in the 
137. Id. at 549 n.20. 
138. See id. at 531-36, 539 (citing Rambus v. Infineon, 222 F.R.D. at 287). 
139. Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see In re Sealed Case, 
676 F.2d 793, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins., No. 01-4183, 
2007 WL 1752036, at *7 (D.N.J. June 18,2007) (finding prima facie support for in 
camera review of privileged materials where counsel and client failed to comply with 
discovery orders). 
140. 126 F.R.D. 545 (D. Minn. 1989). 
141. See id. at 546-47, 550. 
142. See id. at 547-50. 
143. See, e.g., Rambus v. Infineon, 220 F.R.D. at 288-89 (holding that disclosure of a 
document retention policy and "some of the reasons for adopting [that] policy" in 
defending against spoliation and crime-fraud allegations put at issue and waived all 
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opening hypothetical, ABC were to defend against XYZ's motion 
based on its counsel's analysis of the duty to preserve backup tapes, 
that defense would place counsel's advice "in issue." 
A client could knowingly chose to waive any privilege. ABC, for 
example, might feel that its preservation actions were proper and 
voluntarily disclose them to attempt to defeat XYZ's sanctions 
motion. Similarly, a party may inadvertently waive privilege and 
work product protection for counsel's involvement in the 
preservation process, if and to the extent the party claims that its 
preservation efforts were adequate as a defense to claims of 
spoliation. 144 Further, given the traditionally restricted scope of 
attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting, a number of courts 
have held that the attorney-client privilege can be waived where 
counsel's internal investigation had the effect of shielding critical 
facts from discovery and preventing effective examination of 
witnesses. 145 
At the same time, a client might assert that counsel's advice or 
actions were negligent, as a defense to spoliation. 146 In these 
circumstances, under the "self defense" doctrine, counsel might be 
relieved of their ethical obligation to preserve client confidences and 
permitted to disclose attorney-client communications in their own 
defense. 147 This issue was recently addressed in the ongoing 
advice of counsel that went into the preparation of the document retention policy); 
United States ex reI. Mayman v. Martin Marietta Corp., 886 F. Supp. 1243, 1252 (D. 
Md. 1995) (concluding that voluntary disclosure of privileged communications 
waives the privilege as to all communications on the same subject matter). 
144. See McKenna v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 2:05-cv-0976, 2007 WL 433291, at 
*3-4 (D. Ohio Feb. 5,2007) (noting that the defense of "adequate investigation" will 
waive privilege claims for documents prepared by attorneys involved in conducting 
an investigation). 
145. See, e.g., Baker v. GMC, 197 F.R.D. 376,391 (W.D. Mo. 1999); In re S. & E. Dist. 
Asbestos Litig., 730 F. Supp. 582, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
146. See, e.g., Qua\comm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 
66932, at *11 n.6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), enforcing 2007 WL 2900537 (S.D. Cal. 
Sept. 28, 2007), vacated and remanded in part, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 
WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008). Qua\comm asserted that "outside counsel 
selects . .. the custodians whose documents should be searched" in an effort to 
deflect sanctions. Id. at * I 0 n.6. In the subsequent March 5, 2008, order vacating 
and remanding the action in part, the district court expressly applied the "self 
defense" doctrine, noting that the attorneys targeted by the former client's allegations 
should be permitted to use privileged communications in their defense. Qualcomm, 
2008 WL 638108, at *2-3. 
147. See, e.g., Qualcomm, 2008 WL 638108, at *2-3; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 
R. 1.6(b)(5) (2007) (permitting an attorney to disclose confidential client information 
"to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the 
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Qualcomm litigation, when Qualcomm blamed its counsel for failure 
to discover and produce information relevant to a patent SUit. 148 The 
attorneys then sought fcermission to disclose privileged and 
confidential information. I 9 Their request to disclose privileged 
information was initially denied by the United States magistrate 
judge: 
[T]he Court holds that the federal self-defense exception 
does not apply to the instant situation in which a client and 
its attorneys are alleged to have engaged in discovery 
misconduct during the course of litigation and the case has 
not concluded. Unlike the cases cited in the pleadings and 
during the hearing [citations omitted], the instant dispute 
does not involve a new suit or potential suit by a third party 
against the attorneys nor has the client initiated any 
complaints or allegations against its attorneys. Because 
Qualcomm has not waived the attorney-client privilege and 
this Court holds that the self-defense exception is not 
applicable, the attorneys' declarations should not include 
privileged communications. The declarations, however, 
may include information protected by the attorney work 
product doctrine. Because federal common law mandates 
that work product is a privilege that belongs to the attorney, 
the Court finds that if the attorneys choose to waive the 
attorney work product privilege in their declarations, doing 
so does not violate the attorneys' ethical duties and 
professional responsibilities under Rule 3-100 of the 
California Rules of Professional Conduct, Section 6068 of 
the California Business and Professions Code, or other 
applicable regulations. ISO 
On review of the magistrate judge's decision, however, the district 
judge analyzed four declarations filed by Qualcomm employees. lSI 
Those filings "were exonerative of Qualcomm and critical of the 
lawyer and the client ... or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning 
the lawyer's representation of the client"). 
148. Qualcomm, 2008 WL 66932, at "'II n.6. 
149. Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of the Heller Attorneys' Motion 
for an Order Determining that the Federal Common Law Self-Defense Exception to 
Disclosing Privileged and/or Confidential Information Applies to the Heller 
Attorneys' Response to the Order to Show Cause at 10-12, Qualcomm, No. 
05cv1958-B (BLM) (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17,2007),2007 WL 2821221. 
150. Qualcomm, 2007 WL 2900537, at "'I. 
151. Qualcomm, 2008 WL 638108, at "'3. 
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services and advice of retained counsel.,,152 The court found that the 
declarations introduced sufficient "accusatory adversity" to cause it 
to vacate the prior decision with respect to the six sanctioned 
attorneys.153 It held that the attorneys should be pennitted to defend 
their conduct by disclosing privileged infonnation under the self-
defense exception. 154 
To summarize, there are a number of doctrines that would, in 
certain circumstances, support a decision to consider attorney-client 
implementation communications where there has been a failure to 
preserve ESI. 
V. QUO WARRANTO?: WHAT IS THE BASIS OF A COURT'S 
POWER TO CONSIDER THE CONTENT OF SOME 
ATTORNEY -CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS WHEN THERE 
WAS A BREACH OF THE DUTY TO PRESERVE? 
Where there has not been a breach of the duty to preserve, courts 
have rejected requests to probe the content of attorney-client 
preservation communications, holding them to be either privileged or 
work product. I 55 When, however, there has been a breach of the duty 
to preserve, courts have found it necessary and appropriate to inquire 
into the content of attorney-client communications. 15 The analytical 
framework for addressing requests to discover the content of these 
communications is not unifonn. 
A. The Differing Views 
In the view of some courts, such as the court in Gibson v. Ford 
Motor CO.,157 attorney-client communications, such as the legal hold 
notice, are privileged and/or subject to the work product 
protection.158 As such, they are not discoverable unless an exception 
to the privilege is applicable, as in Rambus v. Infineon. 159 
Other courts appear to implicitly view the communications as not 
privileged. The communications become both relevant and 




155. In India Brewing. Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 237 F.R.D. 190, 192 (E.D. Wis. 2006), 
where there was no showing of a loss of ESI, the court held that the document 
retention policy was irrelevant to the claims or defenses. 
156. See. e.g., Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 435-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
157. 510 F. Supp. 2d 116 (N.D. Ga. 2007). 
158. See id. at 1123-24. 
159. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 220 F.R.D. 264, 283 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
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information. This is apparently the view taken in Zubulake v'60 and 
Land 0 'Lakes. 161 
B. Implications of the Differing Views 
The differing approaches present more than an academic 
distinction, because the scope of the communications that may be 
considered may not be the same under each of these theories. If 
consideration of the attorney-client communications implementing 
the duty to preserve is grounded on the assumption that the 
communications are not privileged or work product, once found 
relevant, there might be no limitation to the scope of discovery into 
those implementing communications and actions taken in carrying 
out the duty to preserve. 162 
If attorney-client communications are considered under a waiver 
analysis, the disclosing party must factor the governing jurisdiction's 
substantive law of waiver into the mix. A party would not, for 
example, be likely to voluntarily disclose privileged information to 
defeat a spoliation motion if the collateral effect of that disclosure 
was a broad privilege waiver, especially one that went beyond 
implementation communications. . 
If the allegedly spoliating party asserts an "advice of counsel" 
defense, by pointing to counsel's advice and actions in defense of the 
alleged spoliation, the scope may be determined under a separate 
rule. 163 In this circumstance, under the doctrine of "in issue" waiver, 
all attorney-client communications on the same subject matter may 
become discoverable. 164 
160. 229 F.R.D. at 435-36. 
16l. 244 F.R.D. 614, 623 (D. Colo. 2007). 
162. The text refers to implementing communications and actions, drawing a distinction 
between those events and attorney-client communications that constitute pure legal 
advice or counsel's opinion work product relating to the duty. That distinction may 
be difficult to draw in practice. 
163. See Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 486 (3d Cir. 1995) ("The 
attorney-client privilege may be waived by a client who asserts reliance on the advice 
of counsel as an affirmative defense. . .. The party opposing the defense of reliance 
on advice of counsel must be able to test what information had been conveyed by the 
client to counsel and vice-versa regarding that advice .... " (citations omitted». 
164. See id. at 486-87 (holding that, where client relies on advice of counsel, client cannot 
"define selectively the subject matter of the advice of counsel on which it relied in 
order to limit the scope of the waiver"); United States v. Skeddle, 989 F. Supp. 917, 
918-20 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (discussing factors considered in evaluating scope of 
waiver); contra Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 
WL 66932, at *13 n.8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) ("Recognizing that a client has a right 
to maintain this privilege and that no adverse inference should be made based upon 
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Alternatively, where a client attempts to place blame for a failure to 
preserve on counsel during litigation, the result may be limited to a 
partial disclosure. For example, in Qualcomm, the court initially held 
that counsel could not invoke the "self defense" doctrine to disclose 
privileged information; however, counsel were permitted to disclose 
work product to defend themselves. 165 In a later decision, however, 
the court held that the self defense doctrine was arplicable and the 
scope of the waiver remains to be seen on remand. 16 
Application of the crime, fraud, or tort exception would likely open 
the door only to consideration of a more limited set of facts. That 
exception may be invoked only upon a prima facie showing that the 
client has engaged in the requisite misconduct in failing to preserve 
relevant documents. 167 Because the crime, fraud, or tort exception is 
interpreted narrowly and the court's proper inquiry would be limited 
to those communications "in furtherance of' the alleged spoliation, 
not all attorney-client communications made in connection with 
fulfilling the duty to preserve would be discoverable. 168 
Thus, to understand the scope of permissible discovery once the 
door is opened, it is necessary to determine the justification for 
demanding or ordering discovery of some attorney-client 
communications. In appropriate circumstances, of course, more than 
one rationale may be properly applicable. 
C. Resolution of the Differing Views: A Duty-Based Approach 
In Fisher v. United States, the Supreme Court wrote that the 
privilege "protects only those disclosures necessary to obtain 
informed legal advice which might not have been made absent the 
the assertion .... "), enforcing 2007 WL 2900537 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007), vacated 
and remanded in part, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. 
Mar. 5, 2008). 
165. Qualcomm, 2007 WL 2900537, at *1. 
166. Qualcomm, 2008 WL 638108, at *3. 
167. See, e.g., Rabushka ex rei. United States v. Crane Co., 122 F.3d 559, 566 (8th Cir. 
1997) (holding that, to apply crime-fraud exception to a particular document, the 
challenging party must make a threshold showing that the legal advice was made in 
furtherance of the alleged fraud or closely related to it); In re Int'I Sys. & Controls 
Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding plaintiffs must 
establish that corporate management had "specific intent" to commit fraud through 
development of the challenged work product documents for the crime-fraud 
exception to apply); Loustalet v. Refco, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 243, 246 (C.D. Cal. 1993) 
(holding crime-fraud exception does not apply where client sought advice of counsel 
regarding the legality of his conduct prior to submitting false statement to SEC but 
counsel was not used "to further" the illegal activity). 
168. See Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 220 F.R.D. 264, 288-91 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
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privilege.,,169 If the duty to preserve ESI was imposed solely on the 
client, and counsel's job was limited to advising the client on the 
nature and scope of that duty, attorney-client communications 
relating to the duty to preserve would fall squarely within the 
privilege protection under the Fisher rule. But decisions such as 
Zubulake V have held that the duty is not the client's alone, and that 
counsel has an independent duty to ensure that relevant information is 
d 170 Th d h d h" 171 preserve . at uty runs to t e court an t e JustIce system. 
It appears that the Zubulake V court may have considered attorney-
client communications because those communications were relevant 
in light of the preliminary showing of breach of the duty to preserve, 
and because they were exchanged pursuant to a common-law duty 
imposed on counsel, not in connection with the client voluntarily 
seeking legal advice. l72 Thus, under this analysis, the duty to 
169. 425 U.S. 391,403 (1976). 
170. As the Zubulake V court wrote: 
I held that UBS had a duty to preserve its employees' active 
files as early as April 2001, and certainly by August 2001, when 
Zubulake filed her EEOC charge.... [T]he central question 
implicated by this motion is whether UBS and its counsel took all 
necessary steps to guarantee that relevant data was both preserved 
and produced. 
. .. Counsel must oversee compliance with the litigation hold, 
monitoring the party's efforts to retain and produce the relevant 
documents. 
229 F.R.D. 422, 431-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (emphasis added). The court stressed the 
need for "[p]roper communication between a party and her lawyer." Id. at 432. 
Other authorities on this point are cited supra note 88. 
171. See discussion infra note 178. 
172. A corollary to the duty to preserve information by effective communications is the 
court's power to allocate sanctions between attorney and client. A court, faced with a 
failure to preserve or failure to produce relevant evidence, may need to determine 
whether the duty was breached by counsel, on the one hand, or by the client, on the 
other, or by both. See Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 430, 432-34; see, e.g., Qua1comm 
Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05CVI958-B(BLM), 2007 WL 1031373 (S.D. Cal. 
Mar. 21, 2007) (ordering party to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed 
on Qualcomm's counsel for litigation misconduct in denying the existence of 
relevant evidence). One leading commentator has noted that "the analysis of the duty 
of preservation at the beginning of litigation and throughout the discovery process 
focuses on the intent and behavior of the parties and counsel .... " Kenneth J. 
Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 Nw. 1. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, ~ 62 (2006), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journaJs/njtip/v4/n2/3/. 
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preserve, and the related duty to communicate in furtherance of that 
duty to preserve, are considered obligations of counsel, and, under 
Fisher, those compelled communications are outside the penumbra of 
the privilege and work product protections. They become relevant 
and discoverable upon a preliminary showing of failure to preserve 
information that should have been preserved. eBay, Gibson, and 
other decisions indicate that litigation hold notices are not 
discoverable, at least without a preliminary showing of a failure to 
preserve evidence.173 Although these courts have understandably 
treated attorney-client communications in the process of carrying out 
the duty to preserve as privileged or work product, an alternative 
rationale is that those communications that make up the process of 
identifying and preserving relevant information are not privileged at 
all. They constitute neither the giving nor receiving of "legal 
advice," and the privilege was not intended to cover routine 
communications between counsel and client when engaged in 
fulfilling this duty to the adversary system. Under Fisher, because 
these communications are mandated, they would have occurred even 
in the absence of a privilege and therefore they are not protected by 
the privilege. 174 This theory fits the basic concepts of privilege. 
Specifically, privilege is in derogation of full disclosure and should 
be limited to communications to obtain legal advice. 175 
This analysis is also consistent with the multiple decisions 
permitting discovery. Zubulake, Keir, Rambus, Cache La Poudre 
Feeds, Capel/upo, United Medical Supply Co., and other decisions 
support the proposition that, where there is a preliminary showing of 
failure to comply with the duty to preserve, some preservation 
communications between attorney and client become relevant and, 
therefore, discoverable. 176 
173. See Gibson v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (N.D. Ga. 2007); In re eBay 
Seller Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-01882 JF (RS), 2007 WL 2852364 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 
2007); see also Muro v. Target Corp., No. 04 C 6267, 2007 WL 3254463, at *9 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 2, 2007) (finding that litigation hold notices appeared to be privileged on 
their face, so not discoverable absent another reason). 
174. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("[S]ince the privilege has the 
effect of withholding relevant information from the fact-finder, it applies only where 
necessary to achieve its purpose. Accordingly it protects only those disclosures 
necessary to obtain informed legal advice which might not have been made absent 
the privilege." (citation omitted)). 
175. Id. 
176. This duty-based approach does not make the communications automatically 
discoverable. Just as the document retention policy was irrelevant in India Brewing, 
Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 237 F.R.D. 190, 194 (E.D. Wis. 2006), in the absence of 
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D. Advantages of a Duty-Based Approach 
Treating these implementing communications as not privileged can 
provide counsel and client with a number of very significant benefits. 
First, it facilitates the resolution of discovery disputes by removing 
the risk of subject-matter waiver from the disclosure of what counsel 
has done and learned in the back and forth with the client on what 
there is, where it is, what should be preserved, and how it should be 
preserved. In the opening hypothetical, for example, ABC's counsel 
retained a non-testifying forensic computer expert and, at counsel's 
direction, the expert and ABC employees preserved some ESI and 
paper documents, but-in conjunction with ABC's attorneys-
determined that other ESI, e.g., certain back up tapes and deleted 
data, need not be preserved. Tactically, ABC may believe that a 
reviewing court will agree with ABC's approach, and ABC might 
wish to disclose these facts in response to XYZ's sanctions motion. 
If the communications were privileged, ABC would risk waiver of 
the privilege by disclosure. If, however, the communications were 
unprivileged, but irrelevant in the absence of an allegation of breach 
of duty, ABC could disclose them without concern that it would be 
waiving the privilege. 
Treating implementing communications as not privileged, but 
irrelevant absent a preliminary showing, would not be inconsistent 
with the purposes of the privilege and the work-product doctrine. 
The duty to preserve goes to the heart of the adversary system and the 
attorney's ethical responsibilities. 177 If relevant information may be 
any showing of a loss of ESI, the attorney-client implementation communications are 
not relevant to any claim, defense, or the subject-matter of the action. 
177. See Silvestri v. GMC, 271 F.3d 583,590 (4th CiT. 2001) ("The courts must protect 
the integrity of the judicial process because, '[a]s soon as the process falters. .. the 
people are then justified in abandoning support for the system. '" (quoting United 
States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 462 (4th CiT. 1993»; Cache La Poudre 
Feeds, LLC v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 620 (D. Colo. 2007) ("To ensure 
that the expansive discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(1) does not become a futile 
exercise, putative litigants have a duty to preserve documents that may be relevant to 
pending or imminent litigation."); United Med. Supply Co. v. United States, 77 Fed. 
Cl. 257, 258-59 (2007) ("Aside perhaps from perjury, no act serves to threaten the 
integrity of the judicial process more than the spoliation of evidence. Our adversarial 
process is designed to tolerate human failings---erring judges can be reversed, 
uncooperative counsel can be shepherded, and recalcitrant witnesses compelled to 
testify. But, when critical documents go missing, judges and litigants alike descend 
into a world of ad hocery and half measures-and our civil justice system suffers. 
To guard against this, each party in litigation is solemnly bound to preserve 
potentially relevant evidence."); RICE, supra note 130, at 123 ("Spoliation is an act 
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destroyed when litigation is anticipated, the basic premises of the 
judicial system are brought into question. Just as the crime, fraud, or 
tort exception is grounded on the need to protect the integrity of the 
justice system, and on common-sense limits to the attorney-client 
privilege, a duty-based analysis furthers the same goal. 178 Just as 
there is no need to protect communications relating to a future crime 
or fraud, there is no need for implementation discussions to be 
protected by a privilege, if they become relevant due to a breach of 
the duty. 
Another practical advantage of this approach is that it is grounded 
on conditional relevancy, not on more adversarial concepts, such as 
the crime, fraud, or tort exception to the privilege. Because it is 
triggered by a preliminary showing of loss of discoverable 
information, rather than the showing of attorney-misconduct, this 
approach, unlike the crime-fraud exception, would permit inquiry 
into such communications upon the negligent loss of discoverable 
information and could avoid acrimonious and protracted discovery 
disputes. 
E. Summary 
If implementation communications are viewed as unprivileged, but 
conditionally protected from discovery as wholly irrelevant, that 
conclusion will have the practical benefit of facilitating the resolution 
of discovery disputes. The "duty" rationale appears best suited to 
effectuate the purposes of both the privilege and the duty to preserve. 
Adequate protection may be provided to attorney-client preservation 
communications in the absence of a loss of discoverable information, 
because disclosure of those communications would be wholly 
irrelevant to the claims, defenses, and subject-matter of the action. 
Where counsel has performed properly, and the client has done 
what it should do, so that the requesting party is unable to make a 
preliminary showing of a breach of the duty to preserve ESI, 
that is fundamentally inconsistent with the adversary system."); Maria Perez Crist, 
Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability of Electronic 
Information, 58 S.c. L. REV. 7,63 (2006) ("[T]he need to maintain an institutional 
memory lies at the core of our judicial system."); Withers, supra note 172, at 189 
("[T]he duty to preserve potential evidence is essential to the courts' truth-seeking 
function, and the routine operations of computer systems cannot be allowed to 
obstruct justice."). 
178. See Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 220 F.R.D. 264, 284 (E.D. Va. 2004) 
(noting that consulting an attorney to commit a crime or fraud is inconsistent with the 
purpose of the attorney-client privilege). 
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attorney-client communications would not be discoverable. Although 
they may have been made in furtherance of a duty, and not in 
connection with privileged legal advice, absent a preliminary 
showing of breach of the duty to preserve, the communications are 
wholly irrelevant to any claim or defense and to the subject-matter of 
the action. The communications also would not be discoverable 
under the crime, fraud, or tort, fact work product, or attorney "self 
defense" exceptions, because there has been no wrongdoing. And, 
the opposing litigant's interests are fully protected because that party 
has the right to ask the client in discovery what steps the client took 
to comply with the duty to preserve. 
Where the requesting party is able to make a preliminary showing 
of a failure to preserve, because the attorney-client communications 
were exchanged in furtherance of an extrinsic legal duty-the duty to 
preserve information-and because the preservation of potential 
evidence is fundamental to fair and equitable civil litigation, courts 
may permit discovery into the litigation hold, the steps taken or not 
taken by counsel, and the client's response to those steps. This is 
necessary both to further the civil justice system and to allocate 
responsibility between attorney and client. 
VI. THE OUTER LIMIT OF CONSIDERING ATTORNEY-
CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS: "PURE" LEGAL ADVICE 
The outer limit, if any, of the power to consider attorney-client 
communications in the context of a breach of the duty to preserve 
remains to be determined. Decisions such as Keir, as well as Sedona 
Guideline No.9, demonstrate that, even where ESI has been lost, 
some communications may be privileged. 179 The limit on 
discoverability may vary depending upon the applicable rationale. 
Thus, what is discoverable under a duty-based approach may differ 
from that available under the other theories, and more than one 
rationale may apply. 
The importance of this analysis was recently demonstrated in 
Qualcomm. 180 Faced with misconduct resulting in the failure to 
produce ESI, and entertaining a request to sanction Qualcomm and its 
attorneys, in both initial opinions the United States magistrate judge 
179. See Keir v. UnumProvident Corp., No. 02 Civ. 8781(DLC), 2003 WL 21997747, at 
*9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2003). 
180. See Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932 
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), enforcing 2007 WL 2900537 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007), 
vacated and remanded in part, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 5,2008). 
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in Qualcomm viewed some communications as privileged. 181 For 
example, the magistrate judge wrote: 
Qualcomm asserted the attorney-client privilege and 
decreed that its retained attorneys could not reveal any 
communications protected by the privilege. Several 
attorneys complained that the assertion of the privilege 
prevented them from providing additional information 
regarding their conduct. This concern was heightened when 
Qualcomm submitted its self-serving declarations describing 
the failings of its retained lawyers. Recognizing that a client 
has a right to maintain this privilege and that no adverse 
inference should be made based upon the assertion, the 
Court accepted Qualcomm's assertion of the privilege and 
has not drawn any adverse inferences from it. 18 
The magistrate judge held that only work product could be 
disclosed by the defending attorneys;183 however, the district judge 
subsequently ruled that the self defense doctrine permitted disclosure 
of privileged material. I84 In neither decision was the court required 
to specify the scope or limits of that disclosure. 
A continuous thread of this article has been that there are attorney-
client communications that relate to implementation of the duty to 
preserve, on the one hand, and communications involving "pure" 
legal advice, on the other. In the opening hypothetical, for example, 
ABC's president asks ABC's attorney to define the outer contours of 
the duty to preserve, and the attorney and client discuss how those 
principles are applicable to ABC in this instance. ABC's counsel 
also determined that certain ESI, e.g., specific back up tapes and 
deleted data, need not be preserved, based on counsel's analysis of 
case law defining the duty to preserve back up tapes and data that are 
not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. 
Under a duty-based approach only implementing communications 
and actions are not privileged. IS5 Thus far courts have not seen the 
need to probe actual legal advice. It appears that such an intrusion 
should seldom, if ever, be necessary or compelled. If ABC's counsel 
determined that back up tapes need not be preserved based on 
counsel's analysis of case law, XYZ needs to know, at most, only 
lSI. Qualcomm, 2007 WL 2900537, at ·1; Qua/comm, 200S WL 66932, at ·13 n.S 
(citations omitted). 
IS2. Qua/comm, 200S WL 66932, at·l3 n.S. 
IS3. Qua/comm, 2007 WL 2900537, at·1. 
IS4. Qua/comm, 200S WL 63S1OS, at ·3. 
IS5. See supra Part V.C. 
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. that the decision was made. XYZ has no need to know the rationale 
of ABC's attorney. 
Under this approach, courts would not pennit discovery of 
counsel's legal advice, even advice directly related to the 
preservation of infonnation such as advice on the duty to preserve, 
the scope of required preservation, and the legal risks of failing to 
preserve. To go beyond the non-privileged actions and routine 
communications involved in the actual process of implementing 
preservation, a party alleging spoliation would be required to show 
much more, such as a waiver, a prima facie showing that the 
opposing party's failure to preserve falls within the crime, fraud, or 
tort exception to the privilege, or some other basis for intruding upon 
the privilege or work product doctrine. 
Thus, the investigation into a party's compliance with its duty to 
preserve should be a multi-step process that in most situations can go 
no further than consideration of implementing communications. As 
illustrated in eBay, the first step is discovery of facts from the client 
demonstrating how the litigation hold was implemented. 186 If it then 
becomes necessary or appropriate to proceed more deeply into the 
nature of attorney-client communications to detennine the magnitude 
of, and prejudice caused by, the failure to preserve, courts may 
cautiously expand that inquiry and consider some of the routine 
attorney-client communications involved in satisfying the duty to 
preserve. This might include when a litigation hold was issued, 
whether and when a forensic expert was retained, what persons were 
identified as "key players," whether outside ESI storage facilities 
were contacted, whether "janitor" programs were suspended, what 
key words were searched, what was preserved, what was not 
preserved, and whether the lost infonnation was unique, relevant, and 
significant. 187 If, however, counsel advised a client that litigation 
holds involve decisions as to whether litigation is reasonably 
anticipated, choice of law, and proportionality considerations, there 
186. In re eBay Seller Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-01882 JF (RS), 2007 WL 2852364, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2007). 
187. See memorandum from John Rosenthal & Tara Kowalski, to Judge Shira Sheindlin, 
Howrey Simon, LLP, 12 (Nov. 14,2007) (available on request) ("To ensure that the 
discovery process is transparent, objective facts, such as what preservation steps were 
taken and when, should not be considered privileged. On the other hand, advice from 
counsel, in any form, regarding the identification, preservation, collection, and 
production of discovery should be privileged. . .. [I]f a party informs his [or her] 
attorney that he [or she] inadvertently (or advertently) destroyed documents, that 
communication should be privileged, even though the fact that the documents were 
destroyed is not privileged."). 
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appears to be no cogent reason for requiring disclosure of that advice, 
absent application of an exception to the privilege. 
Nothing contained in this analysis would prohibit a litigant from 
making a voluntary disclosure. lss Such disclosures would be 
facilitated if the party had taken steps to engage in communications 
implementing the process of preservation with the express 
understanding that they were not confidential and did not incorporate 
legal advice, so that they could easily be disclosed without the need 
for "redaction" to refute any allegations of failure to preserve that 
might later be raised. That disclosure of non-privileged information 
would not extend the outer boundary of discovery to encompass pure 
legal advice. 
Applying these principles to the hypothetical involving ABC 
Corporation, and XYZ Corporation, the threshold inquiry would 
center on XYZ's showing that ABC had breached the duty to 
preserve by failing to effectively communicate. XYZ might make 
this showing either by routine discovery into the processes followed 
by ABC employees to preserve informationls9 or, alternatively, by 
evidence such as that presented by Ms. Zubulake, who had retained 
paper copies of email that UBS failed to produce. 190 Upon a 
preliminary showing, at least portions of ABC's litigation hold letter 
would likely be discoverable. Specifically, the untimely date of the 
letter, preservation instructions given to ABC employees, as well as 
the addressees, should be discoverable. A reviewing court would 
likely wish to determine whether the letter inadequately directed 
preservation of generic categories, such as "relevant evidence," or 
specific documents, such as letters related to the June 2003 contract. 
If the letter contained litigation strategy and work product, that 
portion would likely be subject to redaction, unless needed to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the ktter. It is likely that the key players 
could and would, upon request, be compelled to testify as to what 
they were instructed to do in connection with preservation efforts, 
what they were not instructed to do, and what they did. For example, 
if they were instructed not to preserve back up tapes, that instruction 
188. Prudence would suggest consideration of the precautions outlined in Hopson v. 
Mayor of Bait., 232 F.R.D. 228 (D. Md. 2005). 
189. XYZ might, for example, ask a key employee whether his or her email had been 
preserved, whether back up tapes had been recycled, or whether the employee's 
home computer contained ESI that was relevant, but not preserved. Under eBay, this 
information would be discoverable without any showing of a failure to preserve. 
2007 WL 2852364, at *2. 
190. Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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would likely be discoverable. If counsel did not speak with a key 
player, that fact would also be discoverable. If the corporate 
employees failed to follow counsel's instructions, that failure would 
have to be disclosed. The steps taken by ABC's non-testifying, 
retained forensic expert, and by ABC's employees, to preserve 
information, e.g., which hard drives were imaged and when, whether 
servers were preserved, whether PDAs were examined, whether voice 
mail was preserved, what the cost of preserving backup tapes is, etc., 
would be discoverable, even if that discovery would necessarily 
disclose instructions of counsel. In some circumstances, counsel's 
instructions might be ordered disclosed. Counsel's legal advice 
would not be discoverable, unless, for example, it was placed in issue 
by an "advice of counsel" defense to the spoliation motion or by an 
express waiver by the client. 191 
VII. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In today's practice, counsel and their clients are well advised to 
think early and often about the potential for discovery on discovery. 
Especially in the highly complex world of e-discovery, even with 
good faith efforts, it is very easy to fail to preserve or lose relevant 
information by inadvertence. 192 Even the inadvertent loss of relevant 
data may lead to probing questions into the conduct of counsel and 
client before a court resolves a sanctions motion. 
For this reason, counsel and client should be aware, when drafting 
preservation documents and engaging in implementation discussions, 
that those documents and discussions may voluntarily or 
involuntarily be presented to a court for review in connection with a 
spoliation motion. Prudence suggests, for example, that litigation 
hold letters should not contain surplus tactical and strategic 
discussions, and should be no more expansive than necessary to 
effectively accomplish the preservation task. It may be advisable to 
circumscribe preservation discussions and segregate notes regarding 
the implementation of preservation efforts from substantive 
communications involving the merits of the dispute. Additionally, all 
participants in the adversary process need to consider the probability 
that, even absent a preliminary showing of breach of the duty to 
preserve, the steps taken by a client to preserve information are likely 
discoverable, and that discovery may indirectly disclose some 
information regarding attorney-client communications. 
191. See Part IV.C-D. 
192. See generally Grimm et aI., supra note 16. 
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The preserving party may desire to disclose information about its 
preservation efforts, without disclosing strategic information, in order 
to attempt to dissuade or defeat a spoliation motion. 193 The opponent 
may seek such information to support a spoliation argument. 
As a tactical or strategic matter, attorney and client may 
intentionally draft some or all preservation documents in a manner 
that would create the option of disclosing them without waiving any 
privilege. If implementation discussions are viewed as 
communications that are unprivileged because they are compelled by 
a legal duty, nothing would prohibit voluntary disclosure and such 
disclosure could be made without concerns relating to waiver of 
privileges. Careful drafting may make it easier to respond to a 
spoliation motion. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Certain facts-such as what steps a litigant took, or failed to take, 
to preserve material-should be deemed routinely discoverable. 
Other facts, such as the contents of a litigation hold letter, and 
attorney-client implementation discussions, should require a greater 
showing to support disclosure. Actual legal advice, if disclosable at 
all, should be discoverable only upon a more compelling showing 
and, perhaps, after in camera review. Although, where there is 
evidence of a breach of the duty to preserve, there are mUltiple bases 
for seeking discovery of some attorney-client preservation 
communications, the least problematic approach is to assert that 
implementation communications are unprivileged, compelled 
exchanges that are only conditionally relevant. 
193. See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES 
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT 
PRODUCTION 50 (2d ed. 2007), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org! 
contentimiscFiles/TSC ]RINCP _2nd _ ed _607 .pdf. 
